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THE MYTH OF NONAPPORTIONMENT BETWEEN A
PLAINTIFF AND A DEFENDANT UNDER
TRADITIONAL TORT LAW AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
FOR MODERN COMPARATIVE FAULT
Leonard Charles Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under traditional tort law (that is, tort law before modem com-
parative fault), can the loss suffered by the plaintiff be apportioned
between the plaintiff and the defendant?' Many courts and commen-
tators have stated that with the exception of "avoidable conse-
quences," traditional tort law takes an all-or-nothing approach and
does not allow apportionment.2 This article debunks the myth of
nonapportionment. It shows that traditional tort law does allow ap-
portionment, but that the method of apportionment generally differs
from that of modem comparative fault.
Section II shows the wide extent to which traditional tort law
allows apportionment. Section III shows that the myth of nonappor-
tionment arose primarily because of changes in the terminology of
tort law. Section IV discusses the role of the Restatement of Torts3 in
the persistence of the myth of nonapportionment. Section V discusses
the significance of traditional apportionment for modem comparative
fault.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Memphis State University. B.A., 1966, Univer-
sity of Chicago; M.A., 1970, Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1979, Wayne State University;
Member of the State Bar of Michigan.
1. "Plaintiff," in this article, means a person who has suffered a loss. "Defendant"
means any person, other than the plaintiff, whose conduct is a cause of the plaintiff's loss.
"Conduct" includes action and a failure to act. Thus, in a multi-car collision among X, Y, and
Z, when considering the loss suffered by X, X is the plaintiff, and Y and Z are the defendants
regardless of who is suing whom and regardless of whether a person is a litigant. This article is
only tangentially concerned with situations where there are many defendants.
2. This myth has been asserted in e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977); Annota-
tion, Modern Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having Applicability to Negli-
gence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339 (1977); Annotation, The Doctrine of Comparative
Negligence and Its Relation to the Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 32 A.L.R.3d 463
(1970).
For a discussion of "avoidable consequences," see infra text accompanying notes 97-108.
3. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934).
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Important to the understanding of apportionment is the distinc-
tion between a casualty, an invasion of a legally protected interest,
harm, loss, and damages. "Casualty," in this article, means any un-
fortunate or undesired occurrence. "Invasion of a legally protected
interest" means an actionable wrong. "Harm" means a detriment.
"Loss" means the compensatory value of the harm suffered. 4 "Dam-
ages" means the monetary remedy for an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest.
When the defendant touches the plaintiff, and the plaintiff does
not want to be touched by the defendant, there is a casualty. The
touching, however, does not necessarily involve an invasion of a
legally protected interest, such as where the touching is not offensive.5
The touching also does not necessarily involve any harm, such as
where there is no physical injury or pain and suffering. Sometimes a
casualty is an invasion of a legally protected interest only if there is
harm, such as where the defendant creates a nuisance.6 Sometimes a
casualty is an invasion of a legally protected interest even if there is no
harm, such as where the defendant trespasses on the plaintiff's land.7
Sometimes a casualty is not an invasion of a legally protected interest
even if there is harm, such as where the defendant alienates a third
person's affection for the plaintiff, but the common law action for
alienation of affection has been statutorily abolished. 8
Damages are allowed only where there is an invasion of a legally
protected interest. If an invasion involves no loss, damages generally
are nominal.9 If an invasion involves loss, damages generally are
compensatory. 11
Also important to the understanding of apportionment is the dis-
tinction between causation and blameworthiness. "Causation" means
causation in fact, which refers to the substantial factors that bring
about a casualty, an invasion of a legally protected interest, harm, or
4. This article is not concerned with the criteria by which harm is valuated. Economic
harm can be valuated by at least two methods: (1) objective market value and (2) subjective
personal value. Schwartz, Particular Loss, Average Loss, and Actuarial Loss: The Ethics and
Economics of Alternative Remedies for Wrongful Conduct, 18 CONN. L. REV. 115, 115 n. 1
(1985).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18-19 (1965).
6. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 87 (4th ed. 1971).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
8. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 124.
9. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 20 (1935).
10. Id. § 77. Punitive damages, if allowed, generally must bear some relationship to loss.
Id. § 85.
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loss."1 This article is only tangentially concerned with "legal cause"
or "proximate cause," which refer to limitations on liability despite
causation in fact.' 2 "Blameworthy" means a failure to meet some
standard of right conduct, often described by terms such as "mali-
cious," "intentional," "reckless," and "negligent."
The issue of apportionment arises where the total loss involves
more than one substantial causal factor. In addition to the issues of
determining the total harm suffered by the plaintiff and determining
the amount of money that is commensurate with the harm, there is
the issue of allocating liability for the total loss.'3 Methods of allocat-
ing liability between a plaintiff and a defendant can be divided into
two broad categories: nonapportionment rules and apportionment
rules. Under a nonapportionment rule, either the defendant is liable
for the entire loss or the plaintiff bears the entire loss. Under an ap-
portionment rule, the defendant is liable for part of the loss and the
plaintiff bears the rest of the loss.' 4
II. APPORTIONMENT UNDER TRADITIONAL TORT LAW
Under traditional tort law, apportionment between a plaintiff
and a defendant was allowed if there were distinct harms or a reason-
able basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single
harm." If there was no reasonable basis for apportioning the loss
based on causation, or at least if no party offered evidence that the
loss was apportionable, traditional tort law took an all-or-nothing ap-
proach to damages. 6 Either the defendant was liable for the entire
11. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 41.
12. Id. § 42.
13. Schwartz, The Many Meanings of Comparative Fault: An Economic Analysis of Alter-
native Methods of Apportioning Liability, 17 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 191 (1988).
14. For a discussion of the possible methods of apportionment, see id.
If there are many defendants, under a nonapportionment rule, either one or more defend-
ants is liable for the entire loss or the plaintiff bears the entire loss. Under an apportionment
rule, each defendant is liable for part of the loss and the plaintiff bears the rest of the loss. Id.
Under a nonapportionment rule, if two or more defendants are each liable for the entire
loss, the plaintiff generally decides what share of the judgment will be enforced against each
defendant. Thus, even a nonapportionment rule involves an apportionment. But the appor-
tionment is by the plaintiff, not the judge or jury. Id.
Apportionment of loss has also been called apportionment of harm and apportionment of
damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). If the harm is caused only by
defendants (and not also by the plaintiff) and if damages (the money remedy owed by the
defendants) are compensatory, apportionment of the loss is also apportionment of damages.
But if the harm is caused partly by the plaintiff, "apportionment of damages" is misleading.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 465 (1965), discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 103-08.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 465 (1965). If apportionment could
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loss or the plaintiff could not recover any damages.17
The rule allowing apportionment was quite broad. Apportion-
ment was allowed where the conduct of the plaintiff and the defend-
ant caused similar harm. For example, loss could be apportioned
where the plaintiff's stream was polluted by both the plaintiff and the
defendant,' 8 or where the plaintiff suffered from offensive odors
caused by both the plaintiff and the defendant,' 9 or where the plain-
tiff's land was flooded because both the plaintiff and defendant did
not maintain their respective drainage ditches.20 In a multiple defend-
ants situation, where, for example, the plaintiff's grazing land was
injured by his own livestock as well as that of several neighbors, each
neighbor was liable for only the loss caused by his own livestock.2
If one of the substantial causal factors was an act of nature, the
plaintiff must bear the loss caused by the act of nature. For example,
where the extent to which the plaintiff's property was flooded was
increased by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff must bear the
loss that he would have suffered even if the defendant had not been
negligent.22 The same rule applied where the extent of the plaintiff's
not be based on the causation of loss, traditional tort law refused to apportion damages accord-
ing to any other criterion such as the degree of blameworthiness. Causation of loss was consid-
ered an objective and reasonable criteria for apportionment. The degree of blameworthiness,
on the other hand, was considered subjective and arbitrary. Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel
Prods. Co., 86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974) (refusing to impose comparative negligence).
See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 52, at 313-14.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 74-92.
18. Bowman v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa 234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906); Walters v. Prairie Oil &
Gas Co., 85 Okla. 77, 204 P. 906 (1922).
19. City of New Albany v. Slider, 21 Ind. App. 392, 52 N.E. 626 (1899); Correll v. City of
Cedar Rapids, 110 Iowa 333, 81 N.W. 724 (1900); Randolf v. Town of Bloomfield, 77 Iowa 50,
41 N.W. 562 (1889).
20. Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Smith, 64 F. 679, 680 (3d Cir. 1894).
One who decisively contributes to bring a mischief on himself may not impute it to
another, but he who does hurt to his neighbor cannot escape liability for the damage
thereby occasioned by showing that the person he has injured has also sustained
other or additional damage of the same character through separate acts or omissions
of his own. In such cases, each party is chargeable with the consequences of his own
conduct, and neither of them is at liberty to shift his burden to the shoulders of the
other.
Id. at 680.
21. Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Murray, 45 Ore. 103, 109, 76 P. 1079, 1080 (1904).
It was also competent for the defendant to show . . . that the plaintiff and other
parties had cattle grazing on the same land with his sheep during the time of the
alleged trespass, and that part of the injury complained of was caused by such cattle.
He is liable only for the mischief done by his sheep, and not for that done by animals
belonging to other parties.
Id.
22. McAdams v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 200 Iowa 732, 205 N.W. 310 (1925) (the
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loss was also increased by the plaintiff's negligence or a risk the plain-
tiff assumed.23
Apportionment sometimes involved a distinction between the de-
fendant's negligent conduct and the defendant's nonnegligent con-
duct.2 4 Apportionment could also involve the distinction between
loss for which recovery is barred by the statute of limitations and loss
for which recovery is not barred by the statute of limitations.25
Loss could be apportioned where the defendant caused a casu-
alty, and the plaintiff aggravated or failed to mitigate the harm. For
example, where the defendant negligently started a fire which spread
to the plaintiff's land, but the plaintiff waited three days, after discov-
ering the fire, before trying to put it out, the plaintiff could not recover
damages for the loss caused by the failure to act promptly.26 Where a
collision was caused by the defendant, but the plaintiff's vehicle
caught on fire because the plaintiff negligently left the vehicle without
turning off the motor, the plaintiff could not recover damages for the
loss caused by the fire.27 Where the plaintiff did not seek medical care
after being injured by the defendant, the plaintiff could not recover
defendant partly dammed a river); Sherwood v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 187 S.W. 260 (Mo. App.
1916) (the defendant did not provide sufficient drainage under an embankment); Standley v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 121 Mo. App. 537, 97 S.W. 244 (1906) (the defendant partly
dammed a stream); Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 42 N.M. 325, 77 P.2d 765 (1938) (the defend-
ant poorly designed, built, and maintained a drainage canal system); Wilson v. Hagins, 116
Tex. 538, 295 S.W. 922 (1927) (the defendant built an embankment and ditch that diverted
water onto the plaintiff's land); Radburn v. Fir Tree Lumber Co., 83 Wash. 643, 145 P. 632
(1915) (the defendant obstructed the natural flow of water); Nitro-Phospate & Odam's Chemi-
cal Manure Co. v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 9 Ch. D. 503 (1878) (the defendant did
not maintain an embankment at the required height); Workman v. Great Northern Ry., 139
Rev. Rep. 749, 32 L.J.Q.B. 279 (1863) (the defendant built an embankment that allowed flood
waters to accumulate).
23. Gould v. McKenna, 86 Pa. 297 (1878). In Gould, the plaintiff and the defendant had
adjoining buildings. The defendant extended his building, pitching his roof toward the openly
constructed party wall using only a one-foot apron. During an unusually heavy rainstorm,
water leaked through the wall, injurying the plaintiff's property. The court held that the de-
fendant was liable only for the loss arising from the insufficiency of the apron, and was not
liable for the loss from the rain that would have leaked through the wall anyway or that was
beyond the foreseeable amount of rain.
24. Jenkins v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 331, 51 A. 704 (1902). In Jenkins the
plaintiff's property was injured by smoke from the defendant's trains. Some smoke was emit-
ted negligently and some smoke was unavoidable. The court held that the defendant was liable
only for the loss caused by the smoke that was emitted negligently.
25. Frederick v. City of Joplin, 201 S.W. 1147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918). In Frederick the
plaintiff's land was flooded because of improper grading and drainage by the defendant. Some
of the loss was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that the trier of fact should
apportion the total loss between that which is actionable and that which is not actionable.
26. Talley v. Courter, 93 Mich. 473, 53 N.W. 621 (1892).
27. See Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin, 313 Mich. 528, 21 N.W.2d 841 (1946).
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damages for the loss caused by the failure to seek treatment. 28 And
where the plaintiff continued to load liquid chemicals into a cargo
tank on the defendant's ship after discovering that the cargo tank was
severely contaminated, the defendant was liable only for the chemi-
cals loaded before the plaintiff discovered that the tank was severely
contaminated.29
Apportionment was also allowed where the defendant aggra-
vated the plaintiff's pre-existing harm.3" Such apportionment was al-
lowed regardless of whether the pre-existing harm was caused by the
plaintiff's conduct,3" a risk that the plaintiff assumed,3 2 a third per-
son's conduct,33 an act of nature,34 or unknown causes.3 5
28. E.g., City of Duncan v. Nicholson, 118 Okla. 275, 247 P. 979 (1926). Because of the
negligent conditions of the defendant's premises, the plaintiff fell and broke bones in his arm
and hand. The plaintiff thought the injury was merely a sprain and did not seek treatment for
20-25 days. The plaintiff refused treatment that would require anesthetic. If the plaintiff had
received treatment, he would have recovered completely. The court found the defendant not
liable for the increased harm caused by the plaintiff's failure to procure timely treatment.
Accord Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 153 Md. 264, 138 A. 1 (1927); Wingrove v. Home
Land Co., 120 W. Va. 100, 196 S.E. 563 (1938).
29. Federal Ins. Co. v. Sabine Towing & Trans. Co., 783 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1986) (suit by
an insurance company subrogating to the rights of the insured).
30. A pre-existing harm can be distinguished from a predisposition to harm. With a pre-
existing harm, such as a fractured skull, the harm is actual and certain. With a predisposition
to harm, such as an egg-shell skull, the harm is potential and contingent. For a discussion of
apportionment for a pre-existing harm, see infra text accompanying notes 31-35. For a discus-
sion of apportionment for a predisposition to harm, see infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
31. For example, where the plaintiff stepped in front of a moving train (thus causing a
collision), and the train negligently did not stop quickly after the collision (thus dragging or
rolling over the plaintiff), the plaintiff could not recover damages for the loss caused by the
original collision. He could, however, recover damages for the additional loss caused by the
defendant's failure to stop quickly. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Klee, 154 Ind. 430, 56 N.E.
234 (1900); Weitzman v. Nassau Elec. R.R., 33 A.D. 585, 53 N.Y.S. 905 (1898); Teakle v. San
Pedro, L.A. & S.L. R.R., 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402 (1907).
And where the plaintiff fell off a bridge girder upon which he was playing, and was elec-
trocuted when he hit a power line that the defendant had not properly insulated, damages
should be based on the fact that the plaintiff would have died or been maimed anyway. Thus,
the plaintiff's loss was apportioned between the loss that the plaintiff would have suffered
anyway and the extra loss, if any, that was caused by the electrocution. Dillon v. Twin State
Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932).
32. For example, where an employee's fingers were caught in some rollers (a risk he as-
sumed) and the rollers were turned off, and the employer negligently restarted the rollers (thus
increasing the extent of the employee's harm), the employee could not recover damages for the
loss that he originally suffered. But he could recover damages for the additional loss caused by
the employer. Raasch v. Elite Laundry Co., 98 Minn. 357, 108 N.W. 477 (1906).
And where the plaintiff's house was so poorly built or maintained that it would have soon
collapsed, and the house collapsed prematurely when the defendant excavated a hole four feet
away, the defendant was liable only for the loss of the use of the house for the estimated life of
the house. Dodd v. Holme, 100 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1834).
33. Modave v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 501 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974) (the
plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision; the plaintiff's injuries were aggravated by the
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Loss could also be apportioned where the plaintiff's prior con-
duct, although not itself a cause of a casualty, increased the extent of
the plaintiff's loss from a casualty caused by the defendant. For ex-
ample, where the plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt and was injured in
a collision caused by the defendant, the plaintiff could not recover
damages for the extent to which his loss was increased by the failure
to wear a seat belt.36 Similarly, apportionment was allowable where a
motorcyclist failed to wear a helmet 37 and where a passenger stood up
in a moving truck.38 Where the plaintiff failed to tie down the load on
his truck, and the truck hit a pile of gravel that the defendant negli-
gently placed on the road, and the load crashed into the cab of the
plaintiff's truck, the plaintiff could not recover damages for the extent
to which his loss was increased by his failure to tie down the load.39
Where the plaintiff knew that his land would be flooded by the de-
fendant, but the plaintiff did not take precautions to minimize the
expected harm, the plaintiff could not recover damages for the loss the
malpractice of two hospitals at which she was treated; held: each hospital is liable only to the
extent that it aggravated the plaintiff's loss); Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504, 30 N.W. 674
(1886) (the plaintiff was treated by several doctors; in an action against one of them for mal-
practice, the court held that the jury should separate the harm caused by the defendant's
malpractice from the prior or subsequent harm caused by other doctors and any other cause).
34. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Jones, 108 Ind. 551, 9 N.E. 476 (1886) (the plaintiff's
pre-existing disease was aggravated by a derailment of the defendant's train); Nelson v. Twin
City Motor Bus Co., 239 Minn. 276, 58 N.W.2d 561 (1953) (the plaintiff's arthritis was aggra-
vated when the plaintiff was caught in the doors of the defendant's bus and was dragged for
several feet); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Ector, 131 Tex. 505, 116 S.W.2d 683 (1938) (the
plaintiff's kidney condition was aggravated by a collision of the defendant's street cars); Texas
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lovejoy, 138 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (the plaintiff had
three prior abdominal operations; the plaintiff's condition was aggravated when the plaintiff
drank some broken glass from the defendant's bottle).
35. Felter v. Delaware & H.R. Corp., 19 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa. 1937), affirmed, 98 F.2d
868 (3d Cir. 1938). In Felter the plaintiff's house caught on fire from unknown causes. The
defendant negligently blocked a railroad crossing, thus delaying the fire trucks for 15-20 min-
utes. The court held the defendant liable for the extent that its conduct increased the plain-
tiff's loss.
36. E.g., Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania law); Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969);
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974); Parise v. Fehnel,
267 Pa. Super. 79, 406 A.2d 345 (1979); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C.2d 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
See generally Schwartz, The Seat Belt Defense and Mandatory Seat Belt Usage.- Law, Ethics,
and Economics, 24 IDAHo L. REV. 275 (1988).
37. Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1983).
38. See Dziedzic v. St. John's Cleaners & Shirt Launderers, Inc., 53 N.J. 157, 249 A.2d
382 (1969) (dictum) (the plaintiff was standing up in the defendant's truck when the defendant
caused a collision).
39. See Spruce Equip. Co. v. Maloney, 527 P.2d 1295 (Alaska 1974) (dictum).
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plaintiff could have avoided.' Where a fire started in the tenant's
premises and the tenant failed to call the fire department promptly,
but the fire spread quickly because the landlord's building was poorly
constructed, the landlord could not recover damages for the extent to
which the loss was caused by the faulty construction.4" Where the
plaintiff was driving some livestock at night without a reasonable
number of assistants, and the livestock became entangled in the wire
from one of the defendant's downed telegraph poles, the plaintiff
could not recover damages for the extent to which his loss was en-
hanced by his failure to have a reasonable number of assistants.4 2
And where a drunken passenger was thrown from a street car that
was driven too rapidly around a curve, the passenger could not re-
cover damages for the extent to which his loss was enhanced by his
drunkenness.43
Apportionment was also allowed in the opposite situation where
the defendant's prior conduct, although not itself a cause of a casu-
alty, increased the extent of the plaintiff's loss from a casualty caused
by the plaintiff or a third person. For example, where a plaintiff's
hand was caught in some machinery due to his own negligence or a
risk he assumed, and not due to any negligence of the defendant, but
the plaintiff's entire arm was crushed because of the defendant's negli-
gent maintenance of an emergency brake, liability was apportioned
between the loss that the plaintiff would have suffered and the addi-
tional loss caused by the defendant's failure to maintain the emer-
gency brake."
In summary, apportionment under traditional tort law was con-
cerned with causation of loss. As shown by the above examples, cau-
sation of loss is not necessarily related to causation of a casualty. A
person can be a cause of loss regardless of whether he is a cause of a
casualty. Furthermore, a person can be a cause of loss regardless of
whether his conduct occurs before or after the casualty.
Traditional tort law was based on the principle that a defendant
was liable for only the loss the defendant caused. A defendant was
not liable for the loss caused by other tortfeasors, the plaintiff, or acts
40. Morrison v. Queen City Elec. Light & Power Co., 193 Mich. 604, 160 N.W. 434
(1916).
41. East Hampton Dewitt Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 1234 (2d
Cir. 1973).
42. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
43. O'Keefe v. Kansas City W. Ry., 87 Kan. 322, 124 P. 416 (1912).
44. Scheurer v. Banner Rubber Co., 227 Mo. 347, 126 S.W. 1037 (1910); DeGrazia v.
Piccardo, 15 Pa. Super. 107 (1900).
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of nature. A fundamental goal of traditional tort law was the deter-
mination of the amount of loss the defendant caused.
Since apportionment was allowed in such a wide variety of situa-
tions, why did the myth of nonapportionment arise?
III. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE MYTH OF
NONAPPORTIONMENT
A. Tort Law Before the Abolition of the Forms of Action
The coexistence of apportionment and the myth of nonappor-
tionment can perhaps be explained best by considering the history of
the terminology of tort law. The present categorization of torts into
classes based on the kind of blameworthiness ("malicious," "inten-
tional," "reckless," "negligent," etc.) arose only after the abolition of
the forms of action in the nineteenth century.45
Before the procedural reforms of the nineteenth century, non-
criminal wrongs were classified according to the forms of action, such
as trespass, nuisance, detinue, debt, and case. Trespass, for example,
was an action for a direct and unauthorized interference with person,
land, or chattels.46 Nuisance was an action for a partial obstruction
with the use of a freehold.47
Actions on the case are of special interest. This form of action
arose in the fourteenth century. Originally, actions on the case were
allowed where the technicalities of trespass were not satisfied (such as
where the interference was not direct and unauthorized), and was
generally called "trespass on the case."48 In the fifteenth century ac-
tions on the case were also allowed where the technicalities of nui-
sance were not satisfied (such as where the plaintiff was not a
freeholder).49 Gradually actions on the case were also allowed where
the technicalities of the other forms of action were not satisfied. Thus
there were actions of trespass on the case, nuisance on the case, deti-
nue on the case, debt on the case, etc.5 0 By the sixteenth century
"action on the case" was considered a distinct form of action, replac-
ing earlier terms such as "trespass on the case."5 "Case" quickly
encompassed not only situations similar to, but technically not the
45. See infra text accompanying notes 65-84.
46. C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 66 (1949).
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 74-75.
49. Id. at 93-94.
50. Id. at 76-78.
51. Id. at 77-78.
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same as, the specific forms of action, but also newly actionable wrongs
(such as defamation) unrelated to the specific forms.52 In essence, ac-
tion on the case became a residual form of action wherever none of
the specific forms of action were applicable.
Judicial enforcement of the distinctions between the forms of ac-
tion was cyclical. Sometimes the courts ignored or gave only lip ser-
vice to the technicalities of the forms of action.53 For example, the
requirement that a freeholder must sue for nuisance, rather than on
the case, was abolished in 1601. A plaintiff could, therefore, elect to
sue on the case where previously only nuisance was proper.54 At
other times the technicalities were strictly enforced. 5 If a plaintiff
chose the wrong form of action the suit would be dismissed on proce-
dural grounds, without looking at the merits of the case.
For trespass and case, the liability of the defendant was based
sometimes on blameworthiness and sometimes not on blameworthi-
ness.5 6 In modem terminology, the defendant was sometimes subject
to strict liability. But except for some new torts (such as malicious
prosecution, for which liability was imposed sometimes only for mali-
cious conduct), 7 there was no purpose in distinguishing various cate-
gories of blameworthiness. Although the distinction between
blameworthy and nonblameworthy conduct was sometimes impor-
tant, the particular type of blameworthiness was not important. For
example, if a defendant committed a trespass, it was immaterial
whether he did it maliciously, intentionally, recklessly, or negligently,
just as it was immaterial whether he did it with a rock, a knife, or a
fist. Thus "malice," "intent," "recklessness," "negligent," etc., were
not part of the categorization of trespass and case.58
The categorization of blameworthiness apparently arose from the
distinction between trespass and case. If an interference was direct,
the plaintiff must sue for trespass. If the interference was indirect, the
52. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 67.
54. Cantrel v. Church, 78 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1601) see C. FIFOOT, supra note 46, at 93-95.
55. C. FIFOOT, supra note 46, at 67.
56. Id. at 154-64. Furthermore, liability in some situations apparently was based on
blameworthiness during some periods, but not during others. Id.
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 119.
58. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 375-77 (5th ed. 1942). Although
such terms were not part of the categorization of torts, such terms were used where the defend-
ant was liable only if his conduct was blameworthy. E.g., Waldon v. Marshall, Y.B. 43 Edw.
3, fo. 33, pl. 38 (1370) (veterinarian negligently killed a horse he was trying to cure), reprinted
in C. FIFOOT, supra note 46, at 81.
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plaintiff must use action on the case.5 9 The law made a distinction
between direct and indirect, but not among the various categories of
blameworthiness. Until the nineteenth century, this distinction was
strictly enforced.'
Generally the difference between direct and indirect interference
was clear. For example, if a defendant threw a log that hit the plain-
tiff, the interference was direct. If a plaintiff tumbled over a log
thrown by the defendant, the interference was indirect. 6' But some-
times the distinction was not clear, such as where the defendant threw
a lighted squib at a third party who (in self-defense) threw it at the
plaintiff.62 In cases where the directness of the interference was not
clear, courts considered the kind of blameworthiness to decide which
form of action was proper. Trespass was the proper form if the de-
fendant acted intentionally. Action on the case was the proper form if
the defendant was merely negligent.63
Shortly before the abolition of the forms of action, the kind of
blameworthiness sometimes was considered as important as direct-
ness. If a direct injury was caused by mere negligence, the plaintiff
was given the choice of suing for trespass or on the case, where previ-
ously only trespass was proper.64
B. Tort Law After the Abolition of the Forms of Action
The categorization of blameworthiness became more important
after the abolition of the forms of actions in the nineteenth century.
Freed of the old classification of noncriminal wrongs, the legal profes-
sion developed a new classification based on blameworthiness. 65 The
distinction between intent and negligence, already important in decid-
ing whether trespass or case was the proper form of action,6 6 was a
keystone of the new categorization.
Some commentators have written that negligence and strict lia-
bility each became a "separate tort" or an "independent basis of liabil-
ity."' 67 But the change was more terminological than substantive.
Instead of intentionally, negligently, and accidentally being merely
59. C. FIFOOT, supra note 46, at 184-85. See supra text accompanying notes 46 & 48.
60. C. FIFOOT, supra note 46, at 184-87.
61. Reynolds v. Clarke, 92 Eng. Rep. 410 (1725).
62. Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
63. See C. FIFOOT, supra note 46, at 184-95.
64. Williams v. Holland, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (1833).
65. See, W. PROSSER, supra note 6, §§ 4-5.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
67. E.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 28 at 139.
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different ways of committing a direct or an indirect tort, directly and
indirectly were merely different ways of committing an intentional
tort, a negligent tort, or a strict liability tort. The new terminology
emphasized the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct rather
than that the conduct caused harm.
68
Ironically, trespass (that is, a direct interference with person or
property) was now called an intentional tort, although liability origi-
nally was imposed if the interference was done negligently or some-
times even accidentally.69 Perhaps the association of intent with
trespass arose from cases in which directness was unclear and for
which (prior to the abolition of the forms of actions) trespass was the
proper form if the defendant acted intentionally.7"
The emphasis on blameworthiness supplemented, but did not re-
place causation. If the defendant's conduct was not a substantial
causal factor of the plaintiff's loss, the defendant was not liable, re-
gardless of the blameworthiness of his conduct. Likewise, if the plain-
tiff's conduct was not a substantial causal factor of his loss, the
plaintiff was not barred from recovery, regardless of the blameworthi-
ness of his conduct.7'
The new emphasis based on blameworthiness was not without
effect, however. Occasionally strict liability was reduced to liability
based on blameworthiness,72 or liability based on blameworthiness
was expanded to strict liability.73 Furthermore, an elaborate system
of guidelines arose regarding whether conduct was blameworthy.74
The emphasis on blameworthiness did not change the apportion-
ment rules based on causation where loss was apportionable. But it
did affect the all-or-nothing approach where loss was nonapportion-
able. Differences in the kind of blameworthiness became the basis for
liability for a nonapportionable loss caused by both a plaintiff and a
defendant. If the defendant's kind of blameworthiness was worse
than the plaintiff's kind of blameworthiness, the defendant was liable
for the entire loss. If the plaintiff's kind of blameworthiness was at
least as severe as the defendant's kind of blameworthiness, the plain-
68. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-61 (2d ed. 1937).
69. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, §§ 4, 7-15.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 465 (1965).
72. Stanley v. Powell, [1891] 1 Q.B. 86 (the defendant was not liable for accidentally
shooting the plaintiff in the eye).
73. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (the defendant accidentally
flooded the plaintiff's mine shaft; the defendant was liable although the injury was indirect).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282-328 (1965).
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tiff could not recover any damages. For example, where blameworthi-
ness was divided into the categories of intentional, reckless, and
negligent, a defendant whose conduct was intentional was liable to a
plaintiff whose conduct was merely reckless or negligent. Similarly, a
defendant whose conduct was reckless was liable to a plaintiff whose
conduct was merely negligent. 75
The imposition of liability was dependent upon the degree of
blameworthiness, as well as the kind of blameworthiness,76 in some
states during the nineteenth century. For a nonapportionable loss
caused by a plaintiff and a defendant, the defendant was liable for the
entire loss if his degree of blameworthiness was greater than the plain-
tiff's.77 Although this was a comparative blameworthiness criterion,
it should not be confused with modem apportionment by blamewor-
thiness. Rather, this comparison of blameworthiness retained the
traditional all-or-nothing approach to the awarding of damages for a
nonapportionable lOSS.78
The new categorization based on blameworthiness, however, did
change the terminology concerning multiple causation. The terminol-
ogy shifted from the fact of causation to the nature of the blamewor-
thiness involved in causation. Regarding the plaintiff's conduct,
phrases such as "contributory negligence" and "assumption of risk"
became common.
Some commentators have written that contributory negligence
and assumption of risk each became a "separate defense" or a new
"limit on liability."' 79 But the change was more terminological than
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 481, 482, 501, 503 (1965).
76. Whether two categories of blameworthiness differ in kind or degree depends on how
the categories are defined. For example, consider the relationship of recklessness to negligence
where negligence is defined as conduct that the actor should know will involve an unreasonable
risk of harm. If recklessness is defined as conduct that the actor should know will involve a
high probability of an unreasonable risk of substantial harm, the difference is one of degree
(concerning the degree of probability and the degree of harm). But if recklessness is defined as
conduct that is a conscious disregard of an unreasonable risk of harm, the difference is one of
kind (a subjective standard instead of an objective standard). Schwartz, supra note 12.
77. Galena & Chicago Union Ry. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858); Union Pac. Ry. v. Henry,
36 Kan. 565, 14 P. 1 (1887).
78. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 67, at 434; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
§§ 1.5, 2.1 (2d ed. 1986).
79. E.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 65, at 416.
Contributory causation, however, limited the plaintiff's recovery of damages since medie-
val times and "negligence" was used in contributory causation cases since 1606. Bayly v.
Merrel, 79 Eng. Rep. 331 (1606). In Bayly the defendant hired the plaintiff to transport a load,
the weight of which was fraudulently understated by the defendant. The court held that the
plaintiff cannot recover damages for the harm to his horses because his negligence in overload-
ing his horses and not checking the weight was a cause of the harm.
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substantive.8 ° Instead of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk being merely different ways in which a plaintiff could be a cause
of his own harm, causation of harm was considered as merely a result
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The new terminol-
ogy emphasized the blameworthiness of the plaintiff's conduct, rather
than that the conduct caused harm.
With the change in emphasis from causation to blameworthiness,
the terms "legal cause" and "proximate cause" became common.
These terms did not concern the fact of causation. Rather, they con-
cerned limitations on liability despite causation in fact.8 1 One impor-
tant aspect of proximate cause was superseding cause. Where
multiple causes were sequential in time, liability was sometimes im-
posed on the last wrongdoer.8 2
The interplay of causation, proximate cause, contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, and categories of blameworthiness can be
illustrated by the last clear chance doctrine. Where the plaintiff negli-
gently subjected himself to a risk of harm and the defendant failed to
avoid the harm, the last clear chance doctrine allowed the plaintiff to
recover damages for a nonapportionable loss in some situations de-
spite his contributory negligence. The plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence did not bar recovery if, after exposing himself to a risk, the
plaintiff (1) was unable to avoid the harm by reasonable vigilance and
the defendant realized or had reason to realize the peril or (2) was
able to avoid the harm and the defendant realized that the plaintiff
was inattentive and unlikely to avoid the harm.83 According to the
last clear chance doctrine, if the plaintiff was helpless, the defendant's
conduct was a superseding cause. And if the defendant knew that the
plaintiff was inattentive, the defendant's conduct was more
blameworthy.84
Some courts and commentators have stated that these rules re-
garding the plaintiff's lack of causation, 85 and the defendant's more
severe kind of blameworthiness8 6 or last clear chance, 87 were "excep-
tions" to the contributory negligence doctrine.88 But the better view
80. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 68, at 459-61.
81. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440-53 (1965).
83. Id. §§ 479-80.
84. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 66.
85. See supra text accompanying note 71.
86. See supra text accompanying note 75.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
88. Eg., Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977); V. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 78, § 1.2; H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT §§ 1:6-1:7 (2d ed. 1987).
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is that they were integral parts of a tort liability system that consid-
ered both causation and blameworthiness.
The abolition of the forms of action involved not only a change
in emphasis from causation to blameworthiness, but also a change in
emphasis from causation of loss to causation of casualty. Under this
view, if there were successive casualties, the loss was apportionable.8 9
However, if there were a single casualty or substantially coincident
casualties, the loss was nonapportionable, even if there were a reason-
able basis for determining the contribution of each cause.90
Thus, if the plaintiff's prior negligence merely increased the ex-
tent of the plaintiff's loss, but was not a cause of the casualty, the
plaintiff's conduct was not considered "contributory negligence," and
the loss was nonapportionable. 9' However, if the plaintiff's subse-
quent negligence increased the extent of the plaintiff's loss, the loss
was apportionable under the "avoidable consequences" doctrine. 92
Even if there were successive casualties, the emphasis was on which
person caused each casualty rather than how much loss each person
caused.
Thus the change in emphasis from causation of loss to causation
of casualty sometimes led to a recognition of apportionment in only
limited situations. Instead of considering whether there were distinct
harms or a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause, the emphasis was on whether the casualties were successive or
substantially coincident, and whether the plaintiff's negligence was
prior or subsequent.
An example of the view that causation of casualties was more
important than the causation of loss is Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles
Ferran & Co. 93 In Alcoa the defendant's negligent repair of the plain-
tiff's ship was the cause of a fire. The extent of the plaintiff's loss was
increased by the negligence of the plaintiff, some of which occurred
89. See cases cited supra notes 31-35.
90. Morgan v. Gore, 96 Colo. 508, 44 P.2d 918 (1935); Herrell v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 324
Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929) (dictum).
91. E.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970) (the defendant caused a
collision; the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt increased the extent of his loss); Mahoney v.
Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762 (1929) (the defendant caused a collision; the plaintiff's
speeding increased the extent of his loss); Hamilton v. Boyd, 218 Iowa 885, 256 N.W. 290
(1934) (the defendant caused a collision; the plaintiff was riding on the trunk, which increased
the extent of his loss).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
93. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 242 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. La. 1965),
modified, 251 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1966), affirmed, 383 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 964.
1988-89]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
before the fire started and some after the fire started. In the first trial,
the court held that the plaintiff could not recover damages for the loss
caused by its own prior or subsequent negligence. 94 On rehearing,
however, the apportionment based on causation of loss was modified.
The court held that, since the plaintiff's prior negligence did not cause
a casualty, the plaintiff's recovery of damages is not reduced by the
loss caused by its prior negligence. Apportionment was allowed for
only the loss caused by its subsequent negligence. 95
After the abolition of the forms of action, the distinction between
successive and coincident casualties, and between the plaintiff's prior
and subsequent negligence, often became as important as the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect interference had been before the abo-
lition of the forms of action. There was, however, one big difference.
Before the abolition of the forms of action, the directness of the inter-
ference was important only for procedure and did not affect the sub-
stantive rights of the parties. After the abolition, the timing of events
affected substantive rights.
Although the new terminology emphasized blameworthiness for
casualties, rather than causation of loss, courts still allowed appor-
tionment of loss in a wide variety of circumstances. Even after the
abolition of the forms of action, causation generally determined not
only the existence of liability, but also the extent of liability. A de-
fendant was liable for only the loss that he caused, not for the loss
caused by the plaintiff, other persons, or acts of nature. Where there
were distinct harms or a reasonable basis for determining the contri-
bution of each cause, the loss generally was apportionable. 96
Thus apportionment of loss coexists with the myth of nonappor-
tionment. This coexistence mainly involves terminological problems.
Since the modem terminology of tort law emphasized blameworthi-
ness for casualties, rather than causation of loss, there was an incom-
patibility between substantive law and terminology. There was no
standardized terminology for dealing with apportionment based on
causation of loss.
94. Alcoa Steamship Co., 242 F. Supp. at 974.
95. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823, 832 (E.D. La. 1966),
affirmed, 383 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 15-44.
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IV. THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF THE MYTH
The original Restatement of Torts 7 helped perpetuate the myth
of nonapportionment and the importance of the timing of events. The
Restatement used the terms "avoidable consequences" (which re-
ferred only to the plaintiff's conduct after a casualty) and "contribu-
tory negligence" (which referred only to the plaintiff's conduct that
caused a casualty). The Restatement supported apportionment of loss
for avoidable consequences,98 but not for contributory negligence. 99
The Restatement did not support apportionment where the plaintiff's
negligence caused a predisposition to harm, and perhaps not even
when the plaintiff's harm was pre-existing. 1°°
Regarding the confusing terminology, William Prosser wrote
that situations of multiple causation of harm by a plaintiff and a de-
fendant are often labeled "avoidable consequences" regardless of
whether the plaintiff's conduct was prior, contemporaneous, or subse-
quent.101 Prosser suggested "that the doctrines of contributory negli-
gence and avoidable consequences are in reality the same, and that the
distinction which exists is rather one between damages which are ca-
pable of assignment to separate causes, and damages which are
not."
1 0 2
The traditional rules on apportionment were clarified by the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts :103
Apportionment of Harm to Causes
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribu-
tion of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among
two or more causes. 1° 4
97. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934).
98. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 918 (1939).
99. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 467 (1934).
100. Id. § 461. See supra note 30. On the other hand, the Restatement did support appor-
tionment among defendants based on harms that differed in kind and (for nuisances only)
harms that differed in extent. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 879 comment a, 881 (1939).
101. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 65, at 422-24.
102. Id. at 424.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
104. Id.
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Apportionment applies to all situations in which there are several
causes of harm:
The rules stated in this Section apply whenever two or more causes
have combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and each has
been a substantial factor in producing the harm .... The rules
stated apply also where one or more of the contributing causes is
an innocent one, as where the negligence of a defendant combines
with the innocent conduct of another person, or with the operation
of a force of nature, or with a pre-existing condition which the
defendant has not caused, to bring about the harm to the plaintiff.
The rules stated apply also where one of the causes in question is
the conduct of the plaintiff himself, whether it be negligent or
innocent. 1o
Furthermore: "Such apportionment may also be made where the an-
tecedent negligence of the plaintiff is found not to contribute in any
way to the original accident or injury, but to be a substantial contrib-
uting factor in increasing the harm which ensues." ' 6
The scope of apportionment recognized by the Restatement is
about as broad as that recognized by the courts. 07 The Restatement
clarified some of the terminological confusion by giving a new term
for the concept, "apportionment of harm to causes. ' 08
Despite the abundance of authority allowing the apportionment
of loss between a plaintiff and a defendant, the myth of nonapportion-
ment persists. One reason for the persistence of the myth is that the
terminology of blameworthiness and casualty is too deeply imbedded.
This problem can be illustrated by cases on the apportionability of
loss between a plaintiff who did not wear a seat belt and a defendant
who was at fault for a collision."° Some cases recognized the princi-
ple of apportionment, but were uncertain on whether to call it con-
tributory negligence, avoidable consequences, or some other term. 0
Other cases denied apportionment in such situations because it did
not fit any of the standardized terms: It was not contributory negli-
105. Id. comment a.
106. Id. § 465, comment c.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 15-44. The Restatement, however, seems to apply
only to situations in which the defendant is negligent or reckless, whereas case law allows
apportionment for all torts.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
109. See generally Schwartz, supra note 36; Annotation, Nonuse of Seat Belt as Failure to
Mitigate Damages, 80 A.L.R.3d 1033 (1977); Annotation, Automobile Occupant's Failure to
Use Seat Belt as Contributory Negligence, 15 A.L.R.3d 1428 (1967).
110. E.g., Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971) (decided under
Indiana law).
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gence because that term was used only where the plaintiff's recovery
was totally barred; and it was not avoidable consequences because
that term was used only where the plaintiff's negligence occurred af-
ter the casualty."'
The persistence of the myth is not related to the discussion of
apportionment by blameworthiness (such as comparative negligence).
The merits of apportionment by causation of loss have not been raised
by the opponents of apportionment by blameworthiness. The propo-
nents of apportionment by blameworthiness have not criticized appor-
tionment by causation of loss; they simply deny that it exists." 2
Perhaps the main reason for the persistence of the myth of
nonapportionment is the failure to distinguish apportionment by
blameworthiness and apportionment by causation of loss. Although
these methods of apportionment are fundamentally different," 3 some
courts have considered them to be practically the same. Some courts
disallow apportionment by causation of loss,' 'I or allow it only in the-
ory under impractical conditions," 5 because they disallow apportion-
ment by blameworthiness. This confusion also has been made where
apportionment is allowed, but the decision is unclear on whether it is
allowing apportionment by blameworthiness, apportionment by cau-
sation of loss, or both." 6
V. TRADITIONAL APPORTIONMENT AND MODERN
COMPARATIVE FAULT
Comparative fault has many meanings, including apportionment
by causation of loss and apportionment by blameworthiness." 7
Apportionment by causation of loss is based on the extent to
which each cause contributed to the total loss. Since the amount of
loss is the sole criterion, apportionment by causation is not possible if
there is no reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause. 1
18
Apportionment by blameworthiness is based on the degree of
11l. E.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970).
112. E.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d
400 (1977).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 117-29.
114. Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970).
115. Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967).
116. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
117. Schwartz, supra note 13.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
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blameworthiness of each person. This involves not only an ordinal
comparison of whether one person is more blameworthy than the
other, but also a cardinal comparison of the extent to which one per-
son was more blameworthy than the other." 9 Since the degree of
blameworthiness is the sole criterion, apportionment by blameworthi-
ness is not possible if the blameworthiness differs in kind rather than
degree.' 20 For example, if intent and negligence are considered as dif-
fering in kind, apportionment by blameworthiness is possible among
persons whose conduct was intentional and among persons whose
conduct was negligent; but apportionment is not possible between a
person whose conduct was intentional and a person whose conduct
was negligent.
With apportionment by causation of loss, the relative degree of
blameworthiness is immaterial. With apportionment by blameworthi-
ness, the relative amount of loss caused by each person is immaterial.
Apportionment by causation of loss and apportionment by blamewor-
thiness are not necessarily incompatible. But where both methods of
apportionment are allowed, problems on priority can arise.
One alternative is that apportionment by causation of loss has
priority over apportionment by blameworthiness.1 2 ' Under this alter-
native, apportionment by blameworthiness is allowed only to the ex-
tent that there is no reasonable basis for determining the contribution
of each cause, and thus apportionment by causation of loss is not pos-
sible.' 22 If there is a reasonable basis, apportionment is by causation
of loss, regardless of the kind or degree of blameworthiness. For ex-
ample, if the trier of fact decides that 60% of the loss was caused by
the defendant, neither party could appeal on the ground that the other
119. Schwartz, supra note 13.
120. For the distinction between kind and degree of blameworthiness, see supra note 76.
121. Causation of loss is the primary criterion for apportionment in some comparative fault
states. Eg., Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491 (Me. 1973); Baird v. Harrington, 202 Miss. 112, 30
So. 2d 82 (1947); Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 108 N.W.2d 581 (1961).
Sometimes apportionment by causation of loss is possible only to some extent. Under this
alternative, loss would first be apportioned by causation. The loss from each cause might be
apportioned further by blameworthiness. E.g., Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Palo, 64 F.2d 198 (6th
Cir. 1933) (a seaman's arm was injured in two separate accidents, four days apart; dictum that
the loss from one accident should be apportioned by causation from the loss from the other
accident and then the loss from each accident should be apportioned by blameworthiness;
decided under the Jones Act); The Calliope, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 991 (a ship was injured in two
collisions; held: the loss from one collision should be apportioned by causation from the loss
from the other collision and then the loss from each collision should be apportioned by blame-
worthiness; admiralty case; dictum applying the same principle to all tort cases).
122. Apportionment by causation of loss is possible only where there are distinct harms or
a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. See supra
text accompanying notes 103-04.
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party's degree of blameworthiness was greater or that the other
party's kind of blameworthiness was worse.
A second alternative is that apportionment by blameworthiness
has priority over apportionment by causation.123 Under this alterna-
tive, apportionment by causation of loss is allowed only if blamewor-
thiness differs in kind, and thus apportionment by blameworthiness is
not possible.124 If blameworthiness differs in degree, apportionment is
by blameworthiness, regardless of the apportionability of the harm to
causes. For example, if both the plaintiff and defendant are negligent,
and the trier of fact decides that the plaintiff was twice as negligent as
the defendant (thus allowing the plaintiff to recover damages for only
33% of his loss), the plaintiff could not appeal on the ground that
50% of the loss was caused by the defendant, and the defendant could
not appeal on the ground that 80% of the loss was caused by the
plaintiff.
A third alternative is to allow causation and blameworthiness to
be considered together, with neither having priority. Since the deci-
sion of the trier of fact is based on blameworthiness as well as causa-
tion of loss, neither party could appeal on the ground that the
apportionment was disproportionate to the degree of blameworthiness
or amount of loss caused by each party. This alternative gives the
trier of fact great discretion in deciding the relative importance of
blameworthiness and causation of loss. 12 5
The first alternative is superior to the others. Causation has al-
ways been the essence of all tort liability. Although there sometimes
was liability without blameworthiness, there never was liability with-
out causation. 126 Since no one should be liable for more harm than he
causes, causation rather than blameworthiness should be the primary
basis for the extent of liability, as well as the fact of liability.' 27 Fur-
thermore, apportionment by blameworthiness is inherently subjective
123. Blameworthiness is the sole or primary criterion for apportionment in some compara-
tive fault states. E.g., State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977); Metropolitan Dade County
v. Cox, 453 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. App. 1984); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138
(1977).
124. Apportionment by blameworthiness is possible only if the blameworthiness of each
party differs in degree, rather than in kind. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
In some jurisdictions, apportionment is allowed only among negligent persons-hence
merely comparative negligence, rather than all types of comparative blameworthiness. See
generally H. WOODS, supra note 88, §§ 7:1-7:5.
125. This method of apportionment is used in states where the courts do not understand
the difference between apportionment by blameworthiness and apportionment by causation of
loss. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
126. See supra text accompanying note 71.
127. See supra note 20.
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and arbitrary.1 28 But apportionment by causation of loss, since it is
possible only if there is a reasonable basis for determining the contri-
bution of each cause, is objective and rational.1 29 Apportionment by
causation of loss involves a lower risk that decisions will be based on
prejudice or caprice. Thus, apportionment by blameworthiness
should be allowed (if at all) only when apportionment by causation of
loss is not possible.
128. Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Products Co., 86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974) (refus-
ing to impose comparative fault). See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 52, at 313-14.
129, See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
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